Anglo-Australian law and human rights – the Brennan perspective

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MABO AND OTHERS v. QUEENSLAND (No. 2) [1992] HCA 23; (1992) 175 CLR 1
F.C. 92/014

Aborigines – Constitutional Law – Real Property

High Court of Australia
Mason C.J.(1), Brennan(2), Deane(3), Dawson(4), Toohey(5), Gaudron(3) and McHugh(1) JJ.
HEARING

Canberra, 1991, May 28-31; 1992, June 3. 3:6:1992
DECISION

MASON C.J. AND McHUGH J. We agree with the reasons for judgment of Brennan J. and with the declaration which he proposes.

2. In the result, six members of the Court (Dawson J. dissenting) are in agreement that the common law of this country recognizes a form of native title which, in the cases where it has not been extinguished, reflects the entitlement of the indigenous inhabitants, in accordance with their laws or customs, to their traditional lands and that, subject to the effect of some particular Crown leases, the land entitlement of the Murray Islanders in accordance with their laws or customs is preserved, as native title, under the law of Queensland. The main difference between those members of the Court who constitute the majority is that, subject to the operation of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), neither of us nor Brennan J. agrees with the conclusion to be drawn from the judgments of Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ. that, at least in the absence of clear and unambiguous statutory provision to the contrary, extinguishment of native title by the Crown by inconsistent grant is wrongful and gives rise to a claim for compensatory damages. We note that the judgment of Dawson J. supports the conclusion of Brennan J. and ourselves on that aspect of the case since his Honour considers that native title, where it exists, is a form of permissive occupancy at the will of the Crown.

3. We are authorized to say that the other members of the Court agree with what is said in the preceding paragraph about the outcome of the case.

“29. In discharging its duty to declare the common law of Australia, this Court is not free to adopt rules that accord with contemporary notions of justice and human rights if their adoption would fracture the skeleton of principle which gives the body of our law its shape and internal consistency. Australian law is not only the historical successor of, but is an organic development from, the law of England. Although our law is the prisoner of its history, it is not now bound by decisions of courts in the hierarchy of an Empire then concerned with the development of its colonies. It is not immaterial to the resolution of the present problem that, since the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) came into operation, the law of this country is entirely free of Imperial control. The law which governs Australia is Australian law. The Privy Council itself held that the common law of this country might legitimately develop independently of English precedent (19) See Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Uren (1967) 117 CLR 221, at pp 238, 241; (1969) AC 590, at pp 641, 644. Increasingly since 1968 (20) See the Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth) and see the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth), the common law of Australia has been substantially in the hands of this Court. Here rests the ultimate responsibility of declaring the law of the nation. Although this Court is free to depart from English precedent which was earlier followed as stating the common law of this country (21) Cook v. Cook [1986] HCA 73; (1986) 162 CLR 376, at pp 390, 394; Viro v. The Queen [1978] HCA 9; (1978) 141 CLR 88, at pp 93, 120-121, 132, 135, 150-151, 166, 174, it cannot do so where the departure would fracture what I have called the skeleton of principle. The Court is even more reluctant to depart from earliER decisions of its own (22) Jones v. The Commonwealth (1987) 61 ALJR 348, at p 349; 71 ALR 497, at pp 498-499; John v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1989] HCA 5; (1989) 166 CLR 417, at pp 438-439, 451-452; McKinney v. The Queen [1991] HCA 6; (1991) 171 CLR 468, at pp 481-482. The peace and order of Australian society is built on the legal system. It can be modified to bring it into conformity with contemporary notions of justice and human rights, but it cannot be destroyed. It is not possible, a priori, to distinguish between cases that express a skeletal principle and those which do not, but no case can command unquestioning adherence if the rule it expresses seriously offends the values of justice and human rights (especially equality before the law) which are aspirations of the contemporary Australian legal system. If a postulated rule of the common law expressed in earlier cases seriously offends those contemporary values, the question arises whether the rule should be maintained and applied. Whenever such a question arises, it is necessary to assess whether the particular rule is an essential doctrine of our legal system and whether, if the rule were to be overturned, the disturbance to be apprehended would be disproportionate to the benefit flowing from the overturning.”

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In layman’s terms, God save the King (Mentally unstable – George III) and let him and his imperial heirs retain all the wrongly expropriated resources of Australia’s First Peoples.

Mentally unstable? Geo III found no problem with the idea that his British ‘estate’ included the country of Australia’s First Peoples on the other side of the planet – not that he had ever met them or been there or had any paper work or title.

Mentally unstable – his imperial heirs who, in the 21st century, opt to promote the pretense that the sovereign is not stark naked vis-a-vis Australian realities.

Time for some sanity in Australian life, and it won’t come from having the High Court of Australia advise the Australian Parliament about the rights of Australia’s First Peoples.

see
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/1992/23.html?query=^mabo